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Abstract
Although Hirschman’s exit–voice theoretical model has been applied to labor markets, 
research up to now has not tested one of its most important features: the impact of job 
quality on exit–voice strategies. Hirschman’s model of consumer behavior explains that 
those individuals unsatisfied with a product’s quality are more likely to “voice,” whereas 
those more concerned with its price are more likely to “exit.” A rationale for this trade-
off is based on information: first, information on the price of alternative options is 
much more accessible than information on quality; second, voice produces more in-
formation than exit and favors opportunities for specific improvements. We transpose 
Hirschman’s assumptions to labor markets and use the French SalSa survey and DADS, 
declaration by employers on social data, to examine the conditions under which French 
employees are more likely to exit, and the conditions under which they are more likely 
to voice. Our results support the Hirschmanian hypothesis. A deterioration by one unit 
in our working-conditions index increases the probability of participation in collective 
action by 5 percentage points. An increase in log hourly wage by one unit decreases the 
probability of quitting by 5 percentage points. 
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Should We Clash or Should I Go? The Impact of Low Wage 
and Bad Working Conditions on the Exit–Voice Trade-off 
Introduction
Hirschman’s seminal book Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) is typically invoked in order 
to understand workers’ strategies on coping with their wage and work conditions. Nev-
ertheless, the mechanisms at the core of Hirschman’s book are rarely analyzed precisely 
and tested empirically. Hirschman does not deal with labor markets and concentrates 
mainly on consumers dissatisfied by the price and the quality of a product. In such 
situations, consumers must choose between two options, exit or voice. Economics tra-
ditionally stresses the importance of exit as the basic market mechanism: firms adapt to 
consumers’ exit through price adjustment. On the contrary, Hirschman stresses the fact 
that the voice strategy may be more efficient than exit. This is the case when consumers 
are primarily dissatisfied with the quality of a product. The reason for this is that voice 
conveys more information than exit and therefore helps firms to react to dissatisfaction. 
The aim of this paper is to adapt Hirschman’s model to labor markets. In the labor 
market, quitting, collective action, wages, and quality of work can be considered as 
direct equivalents of exit, voice, price, and quality of products on the market for goods 
and services respectively. When do workers choose to take part in collective action? 
When do they quit? Transposing Hirschman’s model into the labor market predicts 
that dissatisfaction with pay should favor quitting while dissatisfaction with working 
conditions should favor collective action. The central mechanism relies on the infor-
mation exchange at stake within those two strategies. Quality of work is a complex, 
multidimensional, and partly subjective phenomenon that is much more complex than 
information about pay. A worker will know much more about the pay in a new job than 
about the working conditions. Changing jobs mainly to improve working conditions is 
much more uncertain than changing to improve pay. Inversely, collective protest about 
working conditions gives some objectivity to the grievance and pressures employers to 
take the problem into account and to respond with some improvements. 
The study of this trade-off draws on a French survey (Salsa 2009) that contains questions 
on quits and participations in collective action over the preceding five years. Labor mar-
ket studies addressing the exit–voice trade-off generally privilege union membership 
as the main indicator for voice strategy. This choice may not be well-adapted to France, 
where, as opposed to the American “closed-shop” strategy, unions adopt a universalistic 
strategy, demanding advantages for all workers at the cost of remaining isolated and 
being discriminated against (Coutrot 1998; Bréda 2013). Although union membership 
is quite low, non-unionized workers remain in contact with union delegates and quite 
often join in collective action organized by unions. This study statistically estimates the 
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impact of pay and quality of work on participation in collective action, on the one hand, 
and on quits on the other. Furthermore, we investigate the consequences of those two 
strategies on either pay increase or on work quality improvement.
The paper is organized as follows: the first section deals with previous research concern-
ing the exit–voice trade-off and shows that the issue of work quality has never been fully 
addressed; the second section provides a more in-depth analysis of this trade-off and 
sets up a testable hypothesis; the third section presents the data and the method; the 
fourth section analyses the results and the paper ends with a discussion on the scope 
and the limits of these results.
Previous research 
An important amount of literature has been published in labor economics journals us-
ing Hirschman’s exit–voice theory over the past 30 years. A large and growing body of 
literature has investigated the impact of voice on the likelihood of exit (Freeman 1978, 
1980; Freeman/Medoff 1984; Miller/Mulvey 1991; Willman et al. 2006). Many studies 
have shown that by giving employees the opportunity of voice rather than that of exit, 
employers would benefit from a reduced turnover. But while quality is at the core of 
Hirschman’s book (Barry 1974; Dowding et al. 2000), this important aspect remains 
untested when the concepts of voice and exit are applied to the labor market. 
In 1984, Freeman and Medoff published the book What Do Unions Do?, where they 
adapted Hirschman’s exit–voice model to the job market. They argued that the role 
of unions, as a form of collective voice strategy within firms, goes beyond negotiating 
wage increase above the competitive level. While they acknowledged that non-wage 
effects were significant, their study failed to consider the impact of voice on quality im-
provement as a non-wage effect. They showed only that voice had a positive impact on 
wage increase and reduced the exit rate of employees. 
Miller and Mulvey (1991) used Freeman’s (1980) study to conduct a new survey in which 
they studied the impact of unions on quits, total separations, job tenure, and layoffs in 
the US and in Australia. The main point of Freeman’s (1980) study is that workers are 
likely to take the exit option less often when they have a voice institution for expressing 
their discontent, thus reducing the rate of quits and increasing job tenure. Miller and 
Mulvey (1991) used Hirschman’s exit–voice model in order to analyze the behavior of 
individuals under unionism. They show that unions as a form of voice reduce quits in 
Australia and argue that they also increase job satisfaction. These findings have been 
explained by the fact that though unions have a strong impact on the wage premium of 
their workers compared to non-union workers, many non-wage aspects such as work-
ing hours, vacation entitlements, notice entitlements, and special payments and allow-
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ances are provided as awards and apply both to union and non-union workers alike. 
Similarly, Peterson and Lewin (2000) argued that employees who feel unfairly treated 
by managers weigh the costs and benefits of expressing dissatisfaction versus quitting. 
Willman et al. (2006) used a transaction cost approach to examine the employee’s 
choice to either voice or not. They extended the scope of research to the employee level 
and argued that employers might avoid investments in voice where the costs exceed the 
returns. Even though they discussed the effect of the voice mechanism on the perfor-
mance of employees, they did not take into account the impact of voice strategy on the 
quality of work.   
Hammer (2000) described the benefits of voice from the perspective of improved mo-
tivation, commitment, and team working. The author highlighted the importance of 
studying direct worker participation as a voice mechanism in organizational decision- 
making processes, which should consequently influence the quality of work and con-
tribute to organizational effectiveness. He did not,  however, test the impact of quality 
of work on voice.  
The aforementioned papers made valuable progress in investigating various effects of 
voice strategy on variables such as quit rates and workers’ performance, but no research 
has surveyed nor empirically explored the direct influence of quality of work on the 
exit–voice strategy. Quality of work is at best approached indirectly through work sat-
isfaction or feelings of justice.
Theoretical background
The current paper seeks first to examine and to measure the role of quality of work in 
shaping the exit–voice strategy, and second to assess the consequences of those strate-
gies on either pay increase or work quality improvement. The theoretical arguments are 
based on a more systematic specification of cost and benefit factors and of available in-
formation on wages and work quality in alternative jobs, as well as on the comparative 
evaluation of the outcomes associated with the two alternatives: exit or voice.  
Workers coping with bad working conditions
What happens when workers are dissatisfied with the quality of work? On the one 
hand, voice could seem more costly than exit as it is costly to spend time and energy in 
order to influence a firm and obtain improvements. On the other hand, information 
on the quality of alternative options is poor and change is risky. A way of modeling 
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Hirschman’s view on exit would be to consider the combination of risk aversion and 
of random walk expectations on quality: when signing a new contract, expectancies 
on undisclosed quality are based on the quality experienced in the current contract 
(E(Qt+1) = Qt ). Chances of improvement equate chances of degradation. On the con-
trary, voice strategy conveys collective – and therefore more objective – information 
to employers and offers them a much more precise way to react to dissatisfaction than 
does exit. Chances of improvement are therefore positive.
For consumer markets, Hirschman (1970) argues that buyers will favor voice for more 
complex goods (such as schooling) and complex quality problems (such as car security 
issues). In such cases, information disclosed on quality makes up only a small propor-
tion of the information on quality. Informational problems potentially exist to some 
degree in all markets (Akerlof 1970, 2002) and for any goods. As such, the consumer 
has a choice between either searching for another good or experimenting with the good 
to obtain information about its qualities (Nelson 1970). In the labor market, the cost of 
experimenting with a new job to obtain information about its quality is generally more 
substantial than for most consumer goods, both because quality of work is generally 
more complex than the quality of a good and because it cannot be assumed to be stable. 
Hirschman (1970) argues, moreover, that the voice option is chosen more often when 
exit is difficult, costly, and unavailable. Therefore, if employees do not have other exit 
options – because of the local rate of unemployment, for instance – they will be more 
likely to use voice to communicate the decline of the quality of work. 
We can thus formulate our first hypothesis as: 
H1: Low quality of work favors collective voice. 
Hirschman’s argument does not suggest that dissatisfaction with job quality will never 
lead to employees choosing exit. In some situations, the cost of voice is too substantial 
and disclosed information about the quality of alternative options is sufficient to make 
exit a valuable strategy. Hirschman’s argument implies rather that the internalization of 
the costs and the benefits of exit and voice make the voice strategy on the whole a more 
likely one than the exit strategy.    
H1b: Low quality of work favors collective voice more than exit.
Hirschman argues that voice plays an important role in relation to those goods that 
have a strong public interest component. In order to improve the quality of work, it is 
therefore more likely for collective voice to have a higher impact than individual voice. 
Moreover, the perception of working conditions is highly subjective. When a worker 
complains individually about his working conditions, he might be revealing his sub-
jective preferences and bias more than an objective feature of his working conditions. 
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When protest becomes collective, it tends to give some objectivity to the problem. Free-
man and Medoff (1984) also provide other arguments explaining why collective voice is 
more efficient than individual voice. Firstly, workers’ claims have a “public good” aspect 
that can have a positive influence on other employees. Turning the claim from individu-
al to collective increases the probability of success and sets incentives to join the protest. 
Secondly, employees who individually express their true preferences to their employers 
may risk being fired, whereas at the macro level, collective voice is a sign of power that 
has a protective character for employees, allowing them to express the public interest of 
the whole group and without the risk of being fired.
H1c:  Low quality of work favors collective voice more than  
individual negotiation.
In discussing institutional alternatives for quality improvement, Hirschman (1974) dis-
cusses the paper by Nelson and Krashinsky (1972) in which they argue that knowledge 
between buyers and sellers is disproportional. They claim that buyers lack informa-
tion about the quality of a product and sellers have a dominant role in ignoring the 
component of quality. In the labor market, there is the similar problem of knowledge 
disproportion concerning the standard of quality of work between employers and em-
ployees. In this context, the institutional question is not about how to protect an em-
ployee, but rather how to educate an employer by providing him with information on 
his performance. Voice has an important role in such situations because compared to 
exit, it provides rich and detailed information. Furthermore, exit may not even convey 
the existence of discontent with the quality of work.
Employers’ ignorance, or the substantial degree of ignorance they have about satisfy-
ing certain demands, is a common subject of discussion. At first sight, it seems that if 
an individual is unsatisfied with the quality of work, he would be likely to exit the firm. 
However, the individual with a poorly articulated complaint about the quality of work 
is advised to help the organization and to intensively collaborate with the management 
through the active use of voice. Hirschman argues that voice rather than exit is recom-
mended for poorly understood problems because it transmits direct feedback about 
overlooked poor quality of work. 
Confronted with a collective complaint about the quality of work, an employer can 
improve working conditions through three channels: by improving the working condi-
tions, by compensating for poor working conditions with a pay increase (Smith 1776; 
Rosen 1986), or by offering a combination of these two improvements. We expect the 
solution to depend on the relative cost of work improvement and of differential com-
pensating. When working conditions are very bad, we can assume that the cost of im-
proving them is lower than the cost of compensating for them. 
H2: Collective voice improves the quality of work. 
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Workers coping with low pay
Let us now discuss the strategies adopted by those dissatisfied with their pay. The 
complexity of the labor market, the imperfection of information, the magnitude of 
transactions costs, and the decentralization of the labor market lead to a multiple price 
equilibrium (MacLeod/Malcomson 1993). The wage offered for the same job and the 
same worker characteristics is not unique and can be viewed as a statistical distribution. 
Workers who ceteris paribus earn lower wages are more likely to find improved offers 
among other firms. Inversely, those with higher wages are less likely to find better offers. 
Contrary to employees dissatisfied by the quality of work, employees dissatisfied with 
their pay generally have information about the salary offered by other jobs. Acemoglu 
(2001) thus argues that workers generally benefit from information about the sectors 
that pay higher wages. Furthermore, pay is generally the first informational element 
that will be disclosed and discussed during recruitment. This simple statistical phe-
nomenon enables us to formulate the two following hypotheses.
H3: Low pay favors exit.
H4: Exit improves salary.
Collective voice is also viewed as a traditional working class means to increase wage. In 
France, June 1936 and May 1968 are spectacular examples of successful strikes. Never-
theless, participation in collective voice is costly, and its cost depends on collective coor-
dination. Its success rate is limited and a pay increase following participation in collec-
tive voice is uncertain. On the contrary, quitting does not require that much collective 
coordination, and when an employee exits for another job, he has accurate information 
on the presumably higher salary being offered by his next firm. 
H3b: Low pay favors exit more than collective voice.
H4b: Exit more than collective voice improves salary. 
Individual negotiation may be less costly than collective voice, and therefore more com-
mon. In some situations, it can be a strong leverage for wage increase, especially if the em-
ployee has an exit option. But in many cases, employers may doubt that employees have 
a real exit option and may not pay much attention to individual claims for higher wages. 
H3c: Low pay favors exit more than individual negotiation.
H4c: Exit more than individual negotiation improves salary. 
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Data and method
Data
We have used and matched two French datasets to come to our findings. The first dataset 
comes from a cross-sectional survey of 3,000 French employees, SalSa (les Salaires vus 
par les Salariés), undertaken in December 2008 and January 2009, focusing on the way 
they perceive their wage. The survey was funded by the Corpus program of the French 
National Research Agency (ANR) and was run by the French statistical office (Insee). In-
terviews were conducted by telephone when possible otherwise and face to face. 
To produce the SalSa sample, Insee extracted a random sample of employees from the 
2006 annual declaration of social data DADS (Déclarations annuelles de données socia-
les). The DADS panel data is an declaration procedure imposed on French employers. It 
contains the wages of every wage-earner working in the private sector, in public hospi-
tals, and in local governmental  administrations. Social contributions paid by national 
civil servants are collected through a different system, so the latter are not included in 
this database. In order to overcome this under-representation of the public sector, the 
designers of the survey decided to oversample employees of public hospitals and local 
governmental administrations. As such, 20  % of the initial sample was selected from 
these two groups. Similarly, 10  % of the sample was selected from the top decile of the 
private sector’s wage distribution. In order to limit the cost of the survey, the sample 
was drawn from employees living in the following regions: Alsace, Auvergne, Centre, 
Languedoc-Roussillon, Lorraine, Midi-Pyrénées, Basse-Normandie, Pays de la Loire, 
Picardie, and Rhône-Alpes, as well as in the Essonne department of the Ile-de-France 
(Paris) region. The final sample was made up of 3,117 interviews.
We were therefore able to match responses to the cross-sectional survey with a limited 
selection of variables (due to privacy issues) from the DADS panel data. This selection 
mainly contains the employees’ work career (wages, number of working hours, sector, 
social category, type of job) since 1976. 
Strategy variables
We focus on those interest variables that could be interpreted as ways of improving the 
work situation: voice, exit, and individual negotiation.
In the SalSa survey, the Hirschmanian notion of voice is best captured by a question 
asking whether the employee participated in some form of collective action such as a 
strike, demonstration, or petition (Table 1). 23  % reported such collective participation. 
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Table 1 Voice strategy
1. During the last five years, did you participate in collective action  
(strike, demonstration, petition) linked to your work? (n = 3,117)
... yes 22.6  %
... no 76.4 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 1.0 %
2. [If yes at 1] Consequent to this collective action, did you receive  
a wage increase, a bonus or a promotion? (n = 704)
... yes 23.4 %
... no 73.9 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 2.7 %
3. [If yes at 1] Consequent to this collective action, did you get  
another improvement? (n = 704)
... yes 25.6 %
... no 70.2 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 4.2 %
Note: 22.6 % of the 3,117 respondents participated in collective action at least 
once in the five years before the survey.
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
This strategy, although traditionally viewed as “working class,” is not the most frequent 
among blue-collar workers (Table 2); it can be measured in all social categories, with a 
peak among technician type workers. SalSa also gives subjective indications regarding 
the outcome of the mobilization. Almost a quarter of those who participated report an 
improvement in their pay, and a little more than a quarter report other improvements.1
Table 2 Cross-tables for social categories and strategies
Collective action Exit Individual negotiation
Yes n Yes n Yes n
Managers and professionals (CS = 3) 18.4 % 365 18.5 % 368 44.2 % 362
Technicians and assimilated (CS = 4) 28.9 % 731 17.6 % 735 50.2 % 731
Clerks  (CS = 5) 23.9 % 1,032 16.7 % 1,030 39.7 % 1,015
Qualified blue-collar  (CS = 61–65) 21.1 % 650 18.8 % 656 46.3 % 650
Non-qualified blue-collar (CS = 66–69) 13.7 % 307 25.0 % 312 39.5 % 309
All 22.8 % 3,085 18.4 % 3,101 44.1 % 3,067
Note: 18.4 % of the 365 managers surveyed participated in collective action at least once in the five years prior to 
this study. Missing answers were excluded. Consequently, the number of respondents changes slightly from one 
question to another.
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
SalSa has several exit strategy proxies at different levels of realization. Our main vari-
able is given by a question asking whether the respondent ever voluntarily left his job 
in the past five years (Table 3). 18 % did. Quitting is quite common and evenly distrib-
uted among all social categories of wage-earners (Table 2). We only observe a peak of 
this strategy among non-qualified blue-collar workers, which is coherent with what we 
know about turnover (Kraft 1986). We also know that 42 % of those who quit did so in 
order to obtain a better wage. A second measure is given by the subjective intention of 
quitting. In January 2009, 16 % of the workers wanted to quit, half of them for a bet-
1 The two improvements are positively correlated: 9 % enjoyed both improvements, 15 %, pay 
improvement only, 17 % other improvements only, and 59 % no improvements at all.
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ter wage (Table 3). Nevertheless, we must be cautious when interpreting this variable. 
There might be a gap between the intention to quit and its realization. As such, the 
worker needs to find another option by which he can improve his situation. Thanks 
to the DADS, we have one last measure of exit, given by the people who changed firms 
between the time of the interview (December 2008 or January 2009) and the end of the 
year 2009. We know only whether the respondent changed firms, but not whether he 
did so voluntarily (quit) or non-voluntarily (dismissal, outsourcing, or even a move be-
tween two different subsidies of the same conglomerate). In order to limit the number 
of dismissals, we count only changes of firms separated by less than three months fol-
lowing the end of the contract with the first firm. We believe that this variable, although 
not perfect, is a fair representation of voluntary quits in 2009. This variable is interest-
ing because it reports an event that occurred after the survey, thereby enforcing causal 
interpretations of survey variables on its occurrence. 
Table 3 Exit strategies
1.  In the last five years, have you ever voluntarily left your job? (n = 3,117)
... yes 18.3 %
... no 81.2 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 0.5 %
2.  [If yes at 1] Was the last time for a better wage? (n = 570)
... yes 42.3 %
... no 56.5 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 1.2 %
3.  Do you plan to voluntarily leave your job now? (n = 3,117)
... yes 16.2 %
... no 81.5 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 2.3 %
4.  [If yes at 3] Is it (n = 504)
... essentially in order to receive a better wage 49.6 %
... not because of wages 45.8 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 4.6 %
5.  Changed firms in 2009 after the SalSa survey (n = 3,117)
... yes 5.7 %
... no 94.3 %
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
Individual negotiation with the supervisor is the last strategy reported in SalSa. In our 
survey, people were asked whether they tried such an approach in order to improve 
their salary. 44 % reported doing so (Table 4). We must note that contrary to the two 
previous strategies, the question is directly framed in terms of wage improvement only. 
We do not have information on other possible improvements – especially in working 
conditions – through such means. This strategy is common among all social categories 
(Table 2), with a peak among technicians and assimilated workers (i.e., professions inter-
médaires). This strategy is reported to be partially or totally successful by 60 % of those 
who tried it.
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Table 4 Individual negotiations
1. In the last five years, did you personally approach one of your super-
visors in order to ask him for a wage increase, a bonus, or  a promotion, 
or to otherwise ask him to help you get one? (n = 3,117)
... yes 43.4 %
... no 55.0 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 1.6 %
2. [If yes at 1] Were you successful? (n = 1,353)
... totally 24.2 %
... partially 35.6 %
... no 39.0 %
... doesn’t know or refuses to answer 1.3 %
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
Finally, Table 5 indicates the correlation between the three basic strategies employed (or 
not) in the last five years. As established by previous literature (Freeman 1984; Spencer 
1986), we find a strong negative correlation between voice and exit strategies. 11 % of 
those who voiced have also exited, whereas 21 % of those who did not voice exited their 
firm. Several mechanisms might explain this negative correlation. For one, it corre-
sponds to different types of investment (collective versus individual orientation). When 
a person moves to a new firm, he has a trial period and may not be secure enough to 
participate in collective action. He is also less integrated and less socially constrained to 
join collective action. When someone participates in collective action, he is more likely 
to be integrated into some kind of work group and less likely to abandon it.
Table 5 Correlation between the three main strategies
Exit in [t-5,t[ Individual negotiation in [t-5,t[
Yes n Yes n
Collective action in [t-5,t[
... yes 10.7 % 702 43.0 % 700
... no 20.7 % 2,379 44.5 % 2,346
Chi-squared test Chi2 = 35.7
p-value = 2.3e-09
Chi2 = 0.6
p-value = 0.46
Exit in [t-5,t[
... yes 47.5 % 559
... no 43.3 % 2,500
Chi-squared test Chi2 = 3.40
p-value = 0.07
Note: 10.7 % of 702 respondents who participated in collective action in the past five years quit their job during 
the same period at least once.
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
We do not find any significant first-order correlation between collective action and in-
dividual negotiation. There is, however, a mild positive correlation between exit and 
individual negotiation. Moreover, the full matrix of correlations for our 14 measures of 
workers’ strategies shows that there is a fairly strong correlation of unsuccessful indi-
vidual negotiation and exit strategies (realized or intended) in order to get pay increases 
(Table A1, Appendix). 
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Bad quality of work
In the current paper, we look to test the impact of quality of work on the adoption of 
different work-improving strategies. More specifically, we discuss dissatisfaction with 
the quality of work; as such, the main independent variable is the bad quality of work. 
We built the index BQ2008 with the most negative items of the six working conditions 
variables contained in the 2008–2009 SalSa survey. These variables are high-speed work, 
physically hard work, mentally hard work, dangerous work, convenient working sched-
ule, and liking the work (Table 6). Most working conditions variables are yes/no di-
chotomous variables, except high-speed work (4 items) and liking the work (3 items).
Table 6 Descriptive statistics and correlation of the bad quality of work variables
Mean
(sd)
1 2 3 4 5 6
1.  Works at a fast rate:  
Yes, most of the time
0.433
(0.496)
1.000
2.  Work is physically hard 0.372
(0.484)
0.095 1.000
3.  Work is mentally hard 0.636
(0.481)
0.322 0.046 1.000
4.  Work is dangerous 0.272
(0.445)
0.002 0.340 0.024 1.000
5.  Work schedule is not convenient 0.169
(0.375)
0.099 0.123 0.099 0.048 1.000
6.  Likes what one does during work:  
Generally no
0.032
(0.176)
0.036 0.090 0.051 0.007 0.093 1.000
7.  Bad quality of work index 4.209
(2.991)
0.520 0.566 0.515 0.475 0.489 0.427
Note: The first column contains mean and standard deviation in parentheses. 
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
We believe that these six questions give a balanced picture of the dimensions of the 
quality of work. We constructed the index by adding together the worst items of our six 
questions. In order to give equal importance to each item in the variance of the index, 
we standardized each of these items with its standard deviation.
BQ2008 = high_speed/σhigh_speed + physically_hard/σphysically_hard 
 + mentally_hard/σmentally_hard + dangerous/σdangerous (1)
 + inconvenient/σinconvenient + dislike/σdislike 
Unfortunately, the survey only provides us with working conditions at the end of 2008 
and the DADS panel data doesn’t provide us with any information on working condi-
tions. This may be problematic when we use our 2008 working-conditions index in 
order to explain a work-improving strategy employed in the last five years – that is, 
between 2004 and 2008. We therefore have a clear temporal bias. From this point, two 
approaches are possible. 
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The first consists in using our 2008 bad quality index BQ2008 as a proxy for the bad qual-
ity in 2003 BQ2003, before the occurrence of the work strategy. This option is reliable 
if the given strategies had a rather negligible impact on the working-conditions in-
dex measured. However, if the strategy did effectively improve working conditions, we 
would be underestimating the impact of quality on the strategy. If our Hirschmanian 
theory is correct, this would lead to an underestimation of the role of quality on voice 
much more than that of quality on exit.
The second approach consists in using imputation techniques (Schafer/Graham 2002) 
in order to get an estimation of BQ2003 – bad working conditions in 2003. We can model 
BQ2008 with the 2008 variables, and hypothesize that the parameters will also be correct 
for 2003. This means that we treat the values of BQ2003 as missing observations and that 
we assume that the parameters of the BQ2003 are the same as those of BQ2008. A rationale 
for such assumption is that the broad determinants of quality of work do not change 
quickly. Although the parameters are given for 2008, for the imputed variable we use 
the values of explanatory variables in 2003. The information contained in the imputed 
variable BQI2003 therefore largely depends on the situation in 2003.
2 
Estimation:  BQ2008 = Σk ak 2008 * xk 2008 + u      (2)
Imputation:  BQI2003 = Σk ak 2008 * xk 2003   (3)
The relation between the real 2003 bad quality of work index and our imputation can 
be viewed as a linear relation, as in equation 4.
BQ2003 = b0 + b1* BQI2003 + v      (4) 
S2003–2008 = c + d *  BQ2003 + Σl fl * zl + w     (5) 
S2003–2008 = c + d *  b0 + d * b1* BQI2003 + Σl fl*zl + v + w   (6) 
A condition for estimating the impact d of the real unknown variable BQ2003 strategy in 
equation (5) when we replace it with the imputation variable BQI2003 is that b1 = 1. This 
condition is met if ak 2008 = ak 2003. Therefore, if the real parameters of quality of work 
did not change between 2003 and 2008, our imputation variable is suitable to estimate 
the impact of the working conditions on the work-improving strategy chosen between 
2003 and 2008. 
2 More precisely, we use information in 2003 when the respondent entered the panel data in 2003 
or before (80 % of the sample). Otherwise, we use information at the date of entrance in the 
panel data. That is: 2004 information for 10 % of the sample, 2005 information for 6 % of the 
sample, and 2006 information for 3 % of the sample. As the panel data contains all respondents’ 
job positions in the French private sector, local governmental administration, and hospital ad-
ministration since 1976, it is very unlikely that an exit, a collective action, or an individual 
negotiation “in the last five years” took place for those people before their entrance in the panel 
data. For simplification, we will designate those variables dating from 2003 to 2006 as “2003.”
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In order to model BQ2008, we use the following panel variables that are known for both 
2003 and 2008: age, age squared, social categories, sector, number of working hours, 
number of working hours squared, region, type of firm, type of contract, and an inter-
action of sectors and social categories. We also use SalSa 2008 variables that we can pre-
sume correctly inform the situation in 2003, such as gender and education. Estimates of 
this regression can be found in Table A2 (Appendix).
In order to avoid collinearity problems while estimating the second stage equation 6, it 
is important for some variables xk used in the first stage equation 2 for estimation and 
after imputation, to differ from the control variables zl in the second stage equation 
6. The following variables are used in the first stage regression and not in the strategy 
regression: sector, number of working hours, number of working hours squared, region, 
type of firm, type of contract, and an interaction of sectors and social categories. An 
analysis of variance is given in Table A3 and shows that these sets of specific first-step 
variables have a significant impact on the quality of work.
Pay
The great advantage of SalSa is that we have details about employees’ full careers. Here, 
we take into account the net salary of individuals (firm declared) and the number of 
working hours (firm declared, as well) in order to compute the log hourly wage. This 
variable is calculated both for 2003 and 2008.
In order to see the impact of strategy on pay, we also compute the increase of salary 
from 2003 to 2008 as the difference between the logarithm of 2008 hourly wage and the 
logarithm of 2003 hourly wage.
Other control variables
The strategy models contain continuous variables such as age and number of house-
mates, as well as categorical variables such as gender, relationship status (living with a 
partner or not), and nationality (French or foreigner). Education is measured with a six 
level nomenclature: elementary education, professional technical degree, high school 
degree, 2 years of college, bachelor’s degree, and master’s degree and above. These vari-
ables are measured in the 2008/2009 survey. Apart from age, which we can compute for 
2003, we assume that the respondent did not change in these aspects and that they are 
good proxies of the 2003 situation.
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For social categories we use the French social category nomenclature (firm declared), 
which gives us a five level variable: managers and professionals (CS = 3), technicians and 
assimilated workers (CS = 4), clerks (CS = 5), qualified blue-collar workers (62 ≤ CS ≤ 65), 
and non-qualified blue-collar workers (66 ≤ CS ≤ 69).  This variable is available both in 
2003 and in 2008.
We also control for the year of entrance in the panel data, in order to control for 20 % of 
the sample – generally the youngest, who were not part of the panel in 2003 and began 
(or returned to) the panel between 2004 and 2006. 
Results
In order to test the combination of pay and working conditions on workers’ strate-
gies, we performed Linear Probability Models with the classical OLS technique and 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. In a first version, we performed logistic regressions, 
but such techniques can be problematic when having to compare coefficients from one 
regression to another and when computing interactions (Ai/Norton 2003; Mood 2010). 
The advantage of LPM is that it provides a direct estimation of marginal effects. Advan-
tages and limits of both techniques are subject to recent debates in econometrics. In any 
event, qualitative results are very similar. Results are given in Table 7. As the comparison 
of marginal effects in different models may be difficult when those marginal effects are 
applied to very different base probabilities (5 % versus 20 %), we used the base prob-
abilities and the parameters in order to compute odds ratios and their 90 % confidence 
interval.3 
The first part of the table contains models based on our 2008 working-conditions index 
BQ2008, models in which we have a better description of the working conditions but that 
may be suspect to temporal bias leading to an underestimation of the impact of bad 
working conditions on strategy. The second part of the table contains models based on 
our imputation for 2003 of the working conditions, BQI2003. 
3 For instance, in the first voice model, the base probability of voicing is 23 %. One unit of our 
2008 work-condition index raises this basis probability by 2.1 percentage points to 25.1 % (with 
a 90 % confidence interval between 24.6 % and 25.5 %). We compare these two proportions 
(25.1 % and 23 %) with the classical odds ratio formula: p/(1–p)/[q/(1–q)].
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Bad quality and strategies
Our first hypothesis stated a positive impact of bad working conditions on collective 
action. Based on the 2008 index, this premise holds. One unit from our index signifi-
cantly increases the probability of participation in some form of collective action by 2 
percentage points. As we explained above, this result is subject to temporal bias. As col-
lective action is likely to ask for improvements in job quality and sometimes to obtain it, 
we believe that the 2008 coefficient underestimates its true value. The fact that the bad 
working coefficient is also highly significant regarding the probability of obtaining non-
monetary advantages through voice (and its odds-ratio of 1.13 even higher – Model 4) 
shows that it is very unlikely that collective voice has worsened job quality. This also 
strengthens our interpretation in terms of underestimation of the real parameter with 
the 2008 index. Hence, when we use our 2003 imputed coefficient, we find a much 
stronger coefficient. One unit of the 2003 bad working index marks a very significant 
increase in the probability of participating in collective action by 5 percentage points. 
The fact that bad working conditions have a stronger and more significant impact on 
the probability of participation in collective action leading to non-monetary advantag-
es (that are very likely to be work quality improvements) than on that of participating 
in pay-increasing collective action shows that our interpretation is coherent with our 
Hirschmanian framework.
Let us now compare the voice strategy with other strategies such as exit and individual 
negotiation when quality of work is at stake. The impact of our 2008 index is clearly 
higher and more significant on voice strategy than it is on exit strategy: 2.10 point effect 
in Model 1 versus 0.1 points in Model 5, or formulated as an odds ratio for this compar-
ison, a 1.12 effect on voice versus a 1.01 effect on exit. Nevertheless, we must not forget 
that those who changed jobs may have radically improved their working conditions and 
are now enjoying good working conditions, while having suffered bad working condi-
tions before their move. The temporal bias might be much more profound than for the 
voice strategy. In order to validate our first result, we can use our 2003 imputed index. 
When we do so, the impact of bad working conditions on exit increases substantially 
and almost reaches the 10 % level of significance. Nevertheless, it remains much lower 
than its impact on voice when we measure it with marginal effects (1.3 % versus 4.9 %) 
or with odds-ratios (1.1 versus 1.3). Moreover, the 90 % confidence intervals of the two 
impacts do not overlap, showing that the difference of impact is significant. 
In order to validate this interpretation, we can use other measures of exit that are not 
subject to temporal bias measurement, such as the intention to quit at the date of the 
survey and the fact that a change of employer actually took place in 2009. At first sight, 
bad working conditions in t seem to be a strong and significant determinant of quit 
intentions (Table 8). Nevertheless, their impact is lower on exit intention than their 
impact on voice (when we use our 2003 imputed variable). Moreover, there is a sub-
stantial difference between the desire to quit and effectively quitting. The desire may not 
be realistic – there may be no information about alternative jobs, and, as Hirschman 
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stresses, it is quite likely that the quality of work in other firms, on which a worker has 
little information, is as bad as in the present firm. It is not surprising, then, to see the 
impact of bad working conditions shrink when we analyse their impact on firm change 
the year after the survey (Table 4, Model 24). We can therefore consider that our hy-
pothesis H1b holds.
In the same vein, we also posited that bad working conditions have more impact on 
collective voice than on individual negotiation. The result clearly holds statistically true 
with the measures used. At best, those who engage in individual negotiation enjoy bet-
ter working conditions than those who do not (Table 7, Models 9, 18 and 19). But we 
must recognize that we do not measure all forms of negotiation, only negotiation in 
order to improve wages. We therefore cannot properly evaluate individual negotiation 
with supervisors in order to improve working conditions. As such, while the result is 
compatible with H1c, we would not say that we have truly confirmed it. 
Table 8 Impact of pay and of quality of work on exit (alternative measures)
Intends to quit Intends to quit 
for pay
Intends to quit 
for other reason
Changes firm  
in ]t,t+1]
Wage models 21 22 23 24
2008 Hourly wage 
(log)
–0.0310
(0.0198)
–0.0297**
(0.0150)
–0.0009
(0.0134)
–0.0345**
(0.0152)
2008 Bad working conditions 0.0156***
(0.0024)
0.0089***
(0.0018)
0.0063***
(0.0018)
0.0010
(0.0014)
N 2,878 2,878 2,878 2,939
R2 5.4 % 4.0 % 2.5 % 4.1 %
Odds ratios: Wage 0.79
[0.58–1.01]
0.62
[0.33–0.93]
0.99
[0.68–1.3]
0.35
[–0.1–0.81]
Working conditions 1.11
[1.08–1.14]
1.12
[1.08–1.16]
1.09
[1.05–1.13]
1.02
[0.97–1.07]
Wage satisfaction models 31 32 33 34
2008 Wage satisfaction –0.0989***
(0.0105)
–0.0917***
(0.0086)
–0.0050
(0.0073)
–0.0105*
(0.0061)
2008 Bad working conditions 0.0100***
(0.0025)
0.0037**
(0.0018)
0.0062***
(0.0019)
0.00002
(0.0015)
N 2,844 2,844 2,844 2,900
R2 8.6 % 9.0 % 2.5 % 3.9 %
Note: Estimates of the linear probability models were obtained through OLS regressions. We use the Hu-
ber-White sandwich estimator to correct for heteroscedasticity and compute robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses. Only variables of interest are reported. Besides those variables, we use the following as control 
variables: gender, diploma (6 items), social category in 2003 (5 items), age in 2003, age squared, nationality 
(2 items), relationship status (2 items), and number of housemates. On the last two lines of wage models, 
we compute parameters odds ratio and their 90 percent interval confidence in square brackets.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
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Pay and strategy
Let us now turn to the examination of the impact of low pay on improvement strategies. 
Interpretation is much easier here as we can use information on pay in 2003, before the 
strategy is adopted. Table 7 shows the significant and negative impact of pay on exit 
strategies (Models 5 and 15). We find nearly the same relation for quitting intentions 
(parameter almost significant in Model 21, table 8) and for a change of firm strategy af-
ter the survey (Table 8, Model 24). The relation is all the more important given that the 
person quit in order to improve his pay (Table 7, Models 6 and 16; Table 8, Model 22). 
Pay still has a negative impact on the probability of quitting for other reasons than pay, 
but the magnitude is less important and the effect is less significant. Finally, in Table 8, 
we can use wage satisfaction instead of pay in order to predict quit intentions and effec-
tive exits (Models 31 to 34). Results are globally similar. We can therefore say that our 
statistical results largely confirm H3. 
If a person wants to improve a bad wage, he can hesitate between quitting, joining a col-
lective action, or trying individual negotiation. We have explained that as far as wage is 
concerned, exit may be more effective than voice considering the collective cost of the 
latter and the uncertainty of its result. In fact, it is not workers with the lowest wages who 
voice the most. Voice is rather associated with higher wages (Table 7, Models 1 to 4 and 
11 to 14). This result is also in line with classical research on industrial relations showing 
that unions and collective action develop in sectors that are protected from competition 
and that can therefore attribute higher wages (Dickens/Katz 1987). A simple comparison 
of the negative significant impact of pay on exit and its positive significant impact on 
voice shows that our results are compatible with H3b. 
Comparison of exit and individual negotiation is a little difficult since the question 
on individual negotiation focuses only on wage increases while exit may have other 
goals. As such, we may instead compare exit for pay and individual negotiation for pay. 
The simple comparison of marginal effects (–2.9 % in Model 6 and –3.4 % in Model 8) 
might be misleading, since the basis probability is very different (8 % of the sample 
exited for pay while 44 % tried to negotiate the wage with their supervisor). Using odds 
ratios takes into account that –3 % is a much bigger effect when the basis probability is 
of 8 % than when it is of 44 %. Using this criteria of comparison, it is clear that pay has 
a stronger negative impact (and, moreover, is more significant) on exit than on indi-
vidual negotiation (Table 7, Models 6 versus 8, 16 versus 18). Nevertheless, the signifi-
cance of this difference depends on the model options. A rule of thumb for deciding the 
significance of the difference of two odds ratios could be to see whether the first one is 
outside the confidence interval of the second. This is the case when we compare Models 
16 and 18, but it is not the case when we compare Models 6 and 8. We can therefore say 
that H3c is at least partially confirmed.
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Strategy and improvements
SalSa allows us not only to determine the strategy chosen but also to evaluate the result. 
Panel information on wages makes it possible to estimate the impact of the discussed 
strategies on the hourly wage increase between 2003 and 2008 (Table 9). This estima-
tion is similar to a first difference model. It therefore accounts for constant unobserved 
individual heterogeneity.4
Voluntary exit significantly increases wages by 6.3 % (Table 1, Model 41). It has a signifi-
cantly higher impact than voice or individual negotiation. We can thereby confirm H4, 
H4b, and H4c. Model 42 provides more in-depth detail regarding the combination of 
the strategy, its motivation, and its results on wage. Voluntary exit for pay is associated 
with a 9 % wage increase, while exit for other reasons leads to a milder wage increase of 
3 %. The null effect of individual negotiation in Model 41 is the combination of a 3 % 
positive impact of successful negotiation and of a –5 % impact of unsuccessful nego-
tiation on pay. Voice strategy reported to have increased pay have a 2 % impact on pay, 
which is not significant. 
Table 9 The impact of strategies on pay and quality increase
Impact of strategies on pay increase
41 42
Collective voice –0.0180 (0.0146)
… unsuccessful –0.0180 (0.0186)
… pay increase 0.0191 (0.0281)
… other advantage –0.0379 (0.0264)
Voluntary exit 0.0630*** (0.0166)
… for pay 0.0936*** (0.0231)
… for other reason 0.0378* (0.0217)
Individual negotiation 0.0037 (0.0125)
… successful 0.0299** (0.0142)
… unsuccessful –0.0470*** (0.0173)
N 2,068 2,068
R2 0.9 % 1.9 %
Note: All models are OLS regressions. Only variables of interest are reported. Besides 
those variables, the year of entrance in the panel data was introduced.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p< 0.01.
Source: SalSa (Insee, ANR, CMH, CREST, 2009).
With our data, it is rather difficult to test H2 properly, which states that voice strategies 
tend to improve working conditions. In a first version, we tried to measure the impact 
of the strategies on the variation of prediction of our bad working conditions. But our 
imputation techniques are not precise enough to capture local variations of working 
conditions (we only use broad determinants). Strategies therefore have no significant 
impact. Another possibility would be to use subjective reports of success. The fact that 
4 Besides improving strategies, other time-varying variables such as occupation could be intro-
duced in the model, but we did not introduce them because they could be consequences of the 
strategies rather than independent covariates. 
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people suffering the worst working conditions are the most likely to report non-mone-
tary improvements (among which we may find better working conditions) is clearly in 
line with H2 (Table 7, Models 4 and 14). But it is true that this theoretical element still 
needs more robust and more detailed confirmation.
Discussion and conclusion
To our knowledge, this contribution is the first detailed application of Hirschman’s exit–
voice framework to the labor market stressing the importance of job quality. It provides 
the main reasons why bad working conditions tend to favor voice strategies and low pay 
tends to favor exit strategies. Our main statistical findings support this framework: a 
deterioration by one unit in our index of working conditions increases the probability of 
participation in collective action by 5 percentage points. An increase in log hourly wage 
by one unit decreases the probability of quitting the job by 5 percentage points. More-
over, an exit strategy increases salary by 6 %. Due to data limitation, we are unfortunately 
unable to measure the impact of collective action on the improvement of work quality.
Our first results, although suggestive, have some limitations that we would like to stress 
here. The first is due to the lack of knowledge of working conditions prior to the mea-
sured strategies. Although we try to circumvent this limitation by various means and we 
believe to have a reliable estimation of the qualitative effect of bad working conditions, 
it is true that we can not claim to precisely estimate their true effect. Panel surveys con-
taining information on our four variables – quality, pay, exit and voice – could provide 
a way of confirming our first result in future research.
The second limitation is common to many statistical studies. Our result holds true as 
long as the classical unobserved heterogeneity problem is not a significant issue. More 
detailed panel data could be a way of overcoming this limit. Another possibility would 
be to find instrumental variables for wage and working conditions, but such instru-
ments are difficult to imagine.
We should mention a third limitation that is more theoretical. Provided our results 
still hold true with a better statistical apparatus, they may also be explained within a 
different theoretical framework. The classical framework used for collective action is 
based on bargaining power and on the degree of competition (Budd 2005). In sectors 
protected from competition, unions can raise wages efficiently, perhaps at the expense 
of worsening working conditions, which could seem compatible with the main corre-
lations described in Table 7 (Models 1 and 11). The relative power of our explanatory 
framework compared to others and the possibility of combining diverse theoretical 
frameworks should therefore be submitted to careful scrutiny. 
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We focused on the situation in France in the late 2000s, a period when the unions were 
in a rather defensive position. It would be interesting for future studies to compare dif-
ferent periods and labor market regimes, such as France and the UK. A cross-national 
comparison would provide an opportunity to understand behavioral patterns of indi-
viduals in different unionized settings.
Finally, if our results and theoretical framework hold true, they could be an invitation 
to revise views on collective action. Our study challenges two traditional views about 
collective action. The market view sees collective action as relatively inefficient and even 
when it leads to improvements for workers it does so at the cost of deviating from 
market equilibrium. Exit, on the other hand, is viewed as a pure market strategy that is 
both individually improving and helps to discover the true market equilibrium. In the 
Marxist view, exit is viewed as an individualistic petit-bourgeois strategy that under-
mines class consciousness, whereas collective action is the main means for obtaining 
global and permanent improvements. Our Hirschmanian approach is situated some-
where between the two. It shows the accuracy of the market view in regard to pay and of 
the Marxist view in regard to working conditions. As such, it invites us to associate the 
study of collective action and of unionization more strongly with the issue of working 
conditions, a question that is understudied in the traditional bargaining model. Much 
collective action is in fact, either directly or indirectly, concerned with working condi-
tions. Traditional claims for shorter working days and for increased recruiting, as well 
as disputes concerning redundancy, are also ways of improving working conditions or 
of resisting their degradation.
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